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PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Good morning. This is Judge Sean Lane in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern

District of New York. And we are here this morning for an omnibus hearing in the Purdue Pharma LP Chapter 11 case.

It's jointly administered. And we will start, as we always start with these hearings, with appearances. So let me find out who is here on behalf of the Debtors.

MR. HUEBNER: Good morning, Your Honor. For the

MR. HUEBNER: Good morning, Your Honor. For the record, Marshall Huebner with Davis Polk on behalf of the Debtors. Can I be heard clearly by the Court?

THE COURT: You can be heard crystal clear. Thank

MR. HUEBNER: Terrific. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Oh behalf of the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors?

MR. LISOVICZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Edan
Lisovicz of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld on behalf of the
Committee.

THE COURT: All right. I know we also have folks here from the adversary proceeding, 21-7088, brought by Stacey Bridges and Creighton Bloyd. Let me find out who is here on behalf of the plaintiffs in that case.

MR. OZMENT: Your Honor, this is Frank Ozment, and I am here on behalf of Plaintiffs.

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Pg 15 of 88 Page 15 1 THE COURT: All right. And on behalf of 2 Defendants in that case? 3 MR. FOGELMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Larry Fogelman from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the 4 Southern District of New York on behalf of the United 5 6 States. 7 THE COURT: All right. Good morning. And I 8 wasn't sure if there was any particular counsel who is handling the Defendant's Purdue Pharma specifically in that 9 10 adversary proceeding. 11 MR. TOBAK: Good morning, Your Honor. Marc Tobak, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. And I will be handling the 12 13 adversary proceeding for the Debtors. 14 THE COURT: All right. Good morning. With that, 15 I know there are lots of appearances on the Zoom registry 16 here as is the case whenever we have hearings in this 17 particular matter. But I'm not sure that there are other 18 folks who intend to speak. So rather than try to guess and 19 throw out some names here and perhaps hear crickets, I will 20 simply ask if there's any other party that needs to make an 21 appearance at this time for today. 22 MR. KLAUDER: Good morning, Your Honor. David 23 Klauder. I am the court-appointed fee examiner in the case. 24 The fee applications are on. To the extent that Your Honor

wants to hear from me, I may be heard. Thank you.

Pg 16 of 88 Page 16 1 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Good 2 to have you here. Anyone else? 3 MR. GOLD: Good morning, Your Honor. Matthew Gold from Kleinberg Kaplan Wolff & Cohen. We are one of several 4 fee applicants. I don't know whether Your Honor is --5 6 hopefully Your Honor will not be needing to speak to us. 7 is (indiscernible). But I did want to make a record that we 8 are on participating if Your Honor has any questions. 9 THE COURT: All right. I realize there are a lot 10 of fee applications on for today. And so here's what I can 11 say to folks. I don't need all those appearances now. 12 obviously, people need to speak, they can speak. But then 13 they can make their appearance at that time rather than have 14 everyone enter sort of a protective appearance. So I think 15 we'll be good that way. So if you have a fee application on 16 and you don't know of any issues currently, you can keep 17 your powder dry, as Judge Chapman used to like to say. And 18 if you need to speak, obviously happy to hear from you later 19 in the hearings. 20 Anyone else who needs to make an appearance? All 21 right. 22 Thank you all for being here. And with that, I'll turn it over to you, Mr. Huebner, to kick us off. 23 24 MR. HUEBNER: Sure. Your Honor, if I may,

obviously, we are always hunting to keep costs and expenses

down and to minimize unnecessary burden, not a first request without other people having to ask permission, that as soon as the fee applications are done virtually everyone should leave this hearing because I think that's what they're here for except for the very small number of people who are actually necessary for the few remaining agenda items after the fee application.

THE COURT: All right. That sounds entirely appropriate and wise. So with that, it sounds like we should go to the fee applications first. And take it away.

MR. HUEBNER: Sure, Your Honor. Yeah. So let me give you an omnibus review, Your Honor. So obviously you also haven't seen us in a while because our favorite omnibus hearing of all is the one that gets cancelled. And I think we've achieved that several times in the last two months, which is a good indicator of I think hopefully a properlydone case, including keeping fees down.

I'm also happy to announce that it is my understanding the fee examiner has actually reached agreement with all of the professionals as to which the fee examiner has been working and (indiscernible) applications on for today, as we have done since these cases started. I believe Your Honor was okay with that process the last time we did this, which was your first time. We do have a single omnibus order for efficiency's sake that reflects --

assuming that the Court has no further questions, which obviously is the main event for today that is remaining that reflets the reductions agreed to bilaterally in each case between the fee examiner and each affected professional.

And so we obviously could go down every one of them, but it also would be reflected in the form of omnibus order that would show that the further reductions agreed to, for example.

Just by way of example in the case of Davis Polk, we had already written off \$185,143.50, which was almost eight percent of the application, before we even filed it.

Because that's just what we do. We go through things really carefully. And if we think for one reason or another we should write stuff off, we do. We then agreed to an additional set of reductions on top of the 185 of about \$15,000, bringing us to a total of over \$200,000 and over eight percent.

So I don't know if the Court needs more recitation from any professionals, but just indicative. The fee examiner has always, at least in our case, sent a very thoughtful letter with a variety of questions and requests for further information and some concerns about categories. We have a set of productive exchanges, as we have now had for several years running in this case that should have been over a very long time ago. But that's not for today. And

reached an accommodation that was sensible.

So obviously it's the Court's pleasure to talk to us and track as of course the Court sees fit. But that is all I actually had to say.

THE COURT: All right. Yes. So I am perfectly fine with one order. That seems to be appropriate. And I have no objection to that. And so my thought would be to just group the applications for today the same way you group them in the agenda. There's A through L for Debtor's professionals, N through R for the Official Committee, S through X for Ad Hoc Committee of Governmental and other Contingent Litigation Claimants, Professionals. Y for the multistate government entities group. Z and AA for the nine's professionals, and BB for the fee examiner. And so with the idea that for each of those groups, you'll just open it up for anybody who wishes to be heard, starting with the fee examiner.

So I'll take, Mr. Huebner, your comments to be you're starting us off on the Debtor's professionals. And with that, that's A through L on the agenda, which is filed on the docket of course. And so I'll turn it over to the fee examiner if there's anything the fee examiner wants to address for the Debtor's professionals.

MR. KLAUDER: Good morning, again, Your Honor.

David Klauder. Nothing specific to address. Mr. Huebner

correctly recited the process and the result, at least as specifically as it relates to Davis Polk. Similar process went through for all the Debtor professionals, and there's full resolution on this tranche of fee applications.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KLAUDER: So nothing more to add.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. And let me ask if there's anyone who does wish to be heard on the applications of debtor's professionals A through L. And just to be clear, that's Dechert LLP, Arnold & Porter, King & Spalding, Davis Polk, Jones Day, Ernst & Young, AlixPartners, Skadden Arps, PJT Partners, Grant Thornton, Reed Smith, and Cornerstone Research. And my apologies for truncating folks' names. I'm sure there's somebody who is further down the list of partners whose name I've left out in some of these firms. But just for ease of identification.

So I'm not hearing any responses, and I didn't see any objections on the docket based on the record before me.

And I am happy to approve those interim fee applications that are listed on today's docket as an uncontested matter reflecting the requests made by those professionals and the reductions that either came about before the applications were filed by the professionals including the reductions or the results of conversations with the fee examiner.

So moving right along to the applications related to the Official Committee. I'm not sure who is taking the laboring oar on those.

MR. LISOVICZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Again,
Edan Lisovicz of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld on behalf of
the Committee.

Similar to what Mr. Huebner said, each of the Committee's professionals I believe all took voluntary reductions to their fees before filing their fee applications with the Court. And thereafter, we received comprehensive reports from the fee examiner. And where appropriate, each of the professionals agreed to additional reductions that will be reflected in the proposed order that will be submitted to Your Honor. Akin Gump, just go give an example, wrote off approximately \$130,000 of our fees before we filed any of our fee applications with the court, and then we agreed to write off an additional \$18,000 after discussing with the fee examiner.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. And
I will turn it over to the fee examiner for anything the fee
examiner might want to add as to applications M through R,
which are Jefferies LLC, Cole Schotz PC, Province LLD, Akin
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC,
and Bedell Cristin Jersey Partnership.

Anything from the fee examiner?

1 MR. KLAUDER: Nothing further to add. 2 Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. And 3 let me -- I didn't see any objections filed on the docket, 4 5 which is why the matter is listed as uncontested. But I'll 6 open it up to anyone else who wishes to be heard on the 7 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors professionals, and 8 that is the interim applications on for today. 9 I will let the record reflect that I don't hear 10 any further responses. And based on the record before me, 11 including having reviewed the interim applications on for 12 today, the Official Committee, and hearing the record of the 13 discussions of the fee examiner, I'm happy to approve the 14 interim applications M through R on the agenda, as have been 15 modified after conversations with the fee examiner. 16 So turning next through applications S through X. 17 Brown Rudnick, FTI Consulting, Otterbourg PC, Gilbert LLP, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel, Houlihan Lokey Capital Inc. 18 19 These are applications of the Ad Hoc Committee of Government 20 and Other Contingent Litigation Claimant professionals. 21 not sure who is taking the laboring oar on these. 22 MR. GANGE: Good morning, Your Honor. Caroline 23 Gange of Kramer Levin on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee. 24 Can you hear me clearly? 25 I can hear you just fine. Thank you. THE COURT:

MS. GANGE: Similar to the Debtors and the Official Committee, members of the Ad Hoc Committee took voluntary reductions prior to filing the interim fee applications. And certain of the firms have also agreed to additional reductions with the fee examiner which will be reflected in the order to be filed on the docket I believe this afternoon. THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Anything from the fee examiner on these particular applications? MR. KLAUDER: Nothing to add. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And last but not least, I'll turn it over to anyone else who might wish to be heard on these applications listed as S through X on the agenda. All right. Once again, let the record reflect that I'm not hearing any responses. And I also note that there are no objections filed on the docket. So after review of the applications and based on the record of today's hearings, I am happy to approve the interim applications S through X of these particular professionals as modified after their conversations with the fee examiner. And so next up is one application of Caplin & Drysdale for the Multi-State Governmental Entities Group.

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Page 24 1 And I'm not sure who is taking the podium for that. 2 MR. LIESEMER: Good morning, Your Honor. Jeffrey Liesemer on behalf of Caplin & Drysdale, counsel to the 3 4 Multi-State Governmental Entities Group. Can you hear me 5 all right? 6 THE COURT: I can hear you fine. 7 MR. LIESEMER: As Your Honor has said, we have 8 filed a fee application. I am not aware of any issues, but 9 I am available to answer any questions. THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. I'll 10 11 turn it over to the fee examiner. MR. KLAUDER: Your Honor, with respect to Caplin 12 13 & Drysdale, no issues. We had a dialogue with them and 14 worked through the questions I had. So nothing further to 15 add. Thank you. 16 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. As I note, 17 there were no objections filed to the application, but I'll 18 turn it over to anyone else who wishes to be heard as the 19 application of Caplin & Drysdale identified as Y on the list 20 of uncontested matter interim fee applications. Anyone wish 21 to be heard? All right. 22 Once again, there is no one who wishes to be 23 heard. And once again, based on the record before me 24 including the application and today's hearing, I am happy to 25 approve the interim fee application has been submitted.

Pg 25 of 88 Page 25 1 So next up is "The Nine's Professionals", which 2 are applications Z and AA. First with Kleinberg Kaplan Wolff & Cohen, and second of Pullman & Comley. And so I'll 3 turn the podium to whoever is handling those. 4 MR. GOLD: Thank you, Your Honor. Matthew Gold 5 6 from Kleinberg Kaplan Wolff & Cohan. Can you hear me 7 clearly? 8 THE COURT: I can hear you just fine. Thank you. 9 MR. GOLD: Thank you, Your Honor. I don't know if 10 I'm taking the lead. I can say for Kleinberg Kaplan that we 11 had a dialogue with the fee examiner and agreed to a reduction of fees which are reflected in the order that will 12 13 be presented to Your Honor. I am aware of no other 14 objections to our application. 15 THE COURT: All right. And on behalf of the 16 Pullman firm? 17 MR. GOLDMAN: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. Irve Goldman for Pullman & Comley. The examiner had some 18 19 helpful comments about our (indiscernible), which we'll be sensitive to in the future. But we did not have a 20 21 recommended reduction, so we are of course satisfied with 22 the allowance of the amount we requested. 23 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. And I'll turn it over to the fee examiner for these two 24

applications.

MR. KLAUDER: Correct, Your Honor. No issues, or 1 2 issues that we raised informally were resolved. 3 objection to the approval of those fee applications. THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. And 4 5 once again, and last but not least, I'll turn it -- I'll 6 open the floor for anybody who wishes to be heard on these 7 two applications. All right. Let the record reflect that 8 there is no one who wishes to be heard. And, again, the 9 record reflects that is no application of these fees. So 10 based on the applications that were filed and that I have 11 reviewed and the record of today's hearing, I'm happy to 12 approve these two interim applications. 13 And so last but not least, we get to the 14 application of the fee examiner listed as BB in the agenda. 15 And let me find out who is taking the laboring oar on that. 16 MR. KLAUDER: Your Honor, David Klauder for the 17 fee examiner. This is consistent with our previous 18 applications in this case. There's been no filed 19 objections. Happy to answer any questions you may have 20 specifically of me. 21 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. And 22 I'll just turn it over to Debtor's counsel if there's 23 anything to add or you'd like to say as to the application of the fee examiner. 24

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, definitely not.

just going to close up this section of the hearing.

So I actually would like to upgrade my request to a request assuming that the Court has no further questions that virtually everyone drop off this hearing right now and turn off --

THE COURT: Hold on one second. I just want to throw it open to the floor if anyone has any comments as to the fee examiner's application. All right. Let the record reflect that I'm not hearing any comments. And again, same ruling based on my review of the application and the record of today's hearing, I'm happy to approve the interim application.

And before anybody drops off, I appreciate that folks are here, and I appreciate it turns out we spent a certain amount of time where there was absolutely no objections because you all have done your jobs properly. Obviously in a case of this magnitude, it's important to have process for purposes of everyone understanding how a case like this works and to continue with that. So thank you for being here.

And with that, I would echo the guidance just provided that it's time for everybody who is here for fee applications and who is not here for anything else to leave the virtual room and enjoy the rest of your day.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, one small request from

Page 28 1 my end. My favorite number in our fee application was that 2 I only billed 71.1 hours for Purdue in three months, which I 3 used to bill every week, and if often felt like every day. Given that there's a lot going on with Silicon Valley Bank 4 5 case, whose hearing is in a few hours, would Your Honor mind 6 terribly if I joined those dropping off given --7 THE COURT: Not at all. That's perfectly fine. 8 Thank you very much. 9 MR. HUEBNER: Okay. 10 THE COURT: Good to see you. Be well. 11 MR. HUEBNER: Thank you, Your Honor. Have a good 12 day. 13 THE COURT: Have a good day. 14 All right. So next up on the agenda I believe is 15 the Funding Agreement Motion. I'll turn it over to counsel. 16 MR. ROBERTSON: Thank you, Your Honor. For the 17 record, Christopher Robertson, Davis Polk & Wardwell, on behalf of the Debtors. Can I be heard clearly in the 18 19 courtroom? 20 THE COURT: Yes, you can. Thank you very much for 21 asking. 22 MR. ROBERTSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Next item on the agenda is the Debtor's motion for authorization to 23 24 enter into a funding agreement with Harm Reduction 25 Therapeutics, Inc. The motion was filed at Docket 5474.

This motion is unopposed.

Very briefly, Your Honor, HRT has developed a lowcost intranasal naloxone device which will be called Revive.

The relief requested today will support HRT's efforts to

make this lifesaving overdose rescue medication available

over the counter at a lower price than similar for-profit

product hopefully as early as the beginning of 2024.

Support for the development of OTC naloxone continues to be

a key public health initiative with the goal that I am

confident all creditors share, abatement of the opioid

crisis and saving lives.

The requested \$9 million of funding is both modest in context of these cases and will enable HRT to fund scale up for distribution and commercial scale of Revive.

As discussed in the motion, the initial \$5 million will be due upon the issuance of binding purchase orders for the intranasal delivery devices with the remaining \$4 million due upon commencement of any factoring of the Revive product by HRT's contract manufacturer.

Unless Your Honor has any questions, we respectfully ask that the request be granted.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Is there any party that wishes to be heard as to this motion?

All right. Hearing no response, I am happy to

grant the motion. I appreciate that education provided in

the moving papers to give me a sense of this as obviously I am not the judge who originally had this case. And so I very much appreciate all of that information which certainly injects a note of optimism which is quite welcome. And so this is good news and I am very happy to approve it. Thank you very much.

MR. ROBERTSON: Thank you, Your Honor. At this time, I would turn the podium over to my colleague, Marc Tobak, who will be handling the adversary proceeding.

THE COURT: All right. So I am happy to do that as well. So I will turn it over to him.

MR. TOBAK: Good morning, Your Honor. This is

Marc Tobak, Davis Polk & Wardwell, for the Debtor-Defendant,

Purdue Pharma LP. Can I be heard clearly?

THE COURT: You can be heard very clearly. Thank you.

MR. TOBAK: Perfect.

Plaintiff's complaint, Your Honor, is an attempt to use the rare and extraordinary remedy of equitable subordination to collaterally attack a settlement between the Debtors and the United States. And it should be dismissed with prejudice for two basic and independent reasons. First, because it's a collateral attack on a final order. Litigation of course, Your Honor, has a beginning and it has an ending. And litigation over the Debtor's

settlements with DOJ should have ended in December 2020 when the time to appeal this court order approving them lapsed and when no appeal was filed. Plaintiffs are now barred from challenging that 9019 order to which they did not object and to which they did not appeal from.

And second, in Plaintiff's own words -- and this is from Page 11 of their opposition brief -- the complaint is a request for equitable subordination about what must be done with the fruits of the Government's prosecution. And while that is certainly what the complaint is about, it is certainly what equitable subordination under the Code is not about. Equitable subordination under the Code cannot be used to reorder the priorities of valid claims to achieve an outcome that Plaintiff would like better. Instead, the Plaintiff must first allege and then later prove that the Government engage in inequitable conduct that worsened Plaintiff's bankruptcy outcomes and that subordination is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy law. And Plaintiffs haven't adequately alleged any of those three.

Now, before addressing each of these two and independent reasons for dismissal in greater detail, it's important to situate the complaint and the DOJ resolution in the broader scope of these cases. And it's important to focus on the fact that approval of the DOJ resolution was one of the watershed moments of these bankruptcy cases. And

it was such an important step because the United States had asserted truly massive claims against the Debtors; a forfeiture claim of at least three-and-a-half billion dollars, allegedly nondischargeable criminal claims of \$6.2 billion, and billions more in other criminal and civil fine claims. Super-priority, nondischargeable claims of that amount could easily have consumed the entire estate and left nothing for other creditors including personal injury claimants such as Plaintiffs.

The DOJ resolution announced on October 21st,

2020, and the subject of the 9019 motion filed that day
provided a global resolution with the DOJ that preserved an
unlocked value for Purdue's other creditors. Pursuant to
the plea agreement and to the civil settlement agreement,
Purdue agreed, among other things, to plead guilty to three
criminal charges, to provide the United States with an
allowed super-priority administrative expense claim against
PPLP in the amount of \$2 billion -- that's the forfeiture
judgement claim -- and to provide the United States with
\$3.544 billion in a criminal fine claim and \$2.8 billion in
a civil fine claim.

Importantly, in exchange, the United States agreed, among other things, to provide a credit, the forfeiture judgement credit, that offsets that forfeiture judgement by up to \$1.775 billion dollar for dollar against

value that was distributed or otherwise conferred by PPLP on account of the claims of tribal, state, and local governments.

And what that means, Your Honor, is that of that agreed \$2 billion of the super-priority forfeiture claim, the Federal Government effectively agreed that \$1.775 billion could be redirected to the abatement and the restitution efforts that would be carried out by tribal, state, and local governments. And those governments in turn agreed under the plan and under the trust distribution procedures established by the plan to dedicate their recoveries to assist communities and individual impacted by the opioid crisis, including, for example, to provide medication-assisted treatment to opioid victims.

Now, the United States did not provide for restitution as a component of Purdue's proposed criminal sentence. And that's because, as stated on Page 4 of the plea agreement, it was believed that restitution was not administratively feasible and would complicate and prolong the sentencing process. And note the sentencing process is separate of course from this bankruptcy case.

What Plaintiffs want now is for the Federal Government to be forced to forego that last \$225 million of the forfeiture judgement claim because of their exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the plea agreement.

Now, objections to the 9019 motion were due on November 10th, 2020. And while some objections were filed, Plaintiffs did not object. They did not object despite having filed their proofs of claim in February and July of 2020, many months before the 9019 motion was filed and many months before objections were due.

After a nearly all-day hearing, Judge Drain entered the 9019 order on November 18th, 2020. That had an immediate and profound impact on this case. As just one example, only a few days later, on November 24th, 2020, PPLP entered a guilty plea. Now, no party appealed the 9019 order, and the order became final and unappealable on December 2nd, 2020.

And that brings us to the first reason the complaint should be dismissed; it is an impermissible collateral attack on that final and now unappealable order. And it's a collateral attack because the Plaintiffs seek to nullify central aspects of that order.

The order itself not only authorizes entry into
the DOJ resolution, it specifically provides that upon entry
of a judgement of conviction consistent with the plea
agreement, the United States will have the forfeiture
judgement claim with "priority over any and all
administrative expense claims, and that the allowed claims"
-- that's the civil and criminal claims -- "shall be

unsubordinated and shall not be subject to subordination."

So if Plaintiffs received the relief that they request, it would be impossible to carry out those terms of the 9019 order. Claims that the order decrees will be allowed with either administrative priority or shall be unsubordinated (indiscernible) subordinated and when party asks for relief, it would undo an order that's final, that's a collateral attack. And it's a bedrock principle of federal procedure that a party that did not object to an order and that did not appeal that order cannot collaterally attack it.

And at least twice the Supreme Court has forbidden collateral attacks on final bankruptcy court orders. And it has done so even when those orders in one case exceeded the subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. And I'm thinking of Travelers Indemnity v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, or in another case where the order plainly and undisputedly seemingly violated the Bankruptcy Code. And that's in United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260.

So the time to litigate this Court's order ended on December 2, 2020 when the time to appeal expired.

Plaintiffs don't appear to dispute that law, but instead argue that the 9019 order is not in fact final, but instead is contingent. But that's wrong.

It's true that the 9019 order provides that

certain contingencies must happen before the time for the Debtor's performance. That is to say the plea agreement must be accepted before the Government is provided with all of the claims agreed to in the DOJ resolution. But that doesn't make the 9019 order anything but final.

In fact, we know that because the Second Circuit has held that a 9019 order is a final order even when it authorizes a settlement that requires a second court's approval, just like the plea agreement here must be approved and accepted by the sentencing court. And that's in Bennett Funding, 439 F.3d 155, 164. This Court's 9019 order was final when entered, and Plaintiff's attempt to undo it now is a forbidden collateral attack.

Now, we could stop here, Your Honor, but I'll turn to that second independent set of reasons that the complaint should be dismissed in case Your Honor reaches those issues.

And that's that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for equitable subordination.

Section 510(c) authorizes the Court to subordinate one claim to another under principles of equitable subordination. And those principles require that Plaintiffs now allege and later prove, one, that the Government engaged in extreme inequitable misconduct; two, that the Government's alleged conduct harmed Plaintiffs and conferred an unfair advantage on the Government; and three, that

subordination would be consistent with bankruptcy law. And that's the three-part test articulated in (indiscernible).

Now, Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that would supply any one of these three requirements. Plaintiffs allege that DOJ acted inequitably first by failing to seek restitution as part of the agreed sentence of Purdue in the plea agreement, and second, by being "complicit in the opioid crisis and improperly enriching itself by failing to appropriately regulate and prosecute debtors."

It's worth pausing a moment on what Plaintiffs ask that this Court do. Plaintiffs ask this Court second guess the exercise of prosecutorial and policy discretion by the United States Department of Justice in a plea agreement and then second guess Congress and the executive branch in how they should have how they should have acted differently to regulate debtors. And all of this would be in derogation of very well-settled doctrines of immunity which we describe at length in our brief.

So it's no surprise that Plaintiffs didn't identify a single case in which a bankruptcy court accepted such an invitation to subordinate the United States' claim based on the United States' policy and prosecutorial discretion. And, respectfully, this Court shouldn't be the first.

But moreover, even if Plaintiffs could surmount

that obstacle, the fact remains that none of the conduct alleged meets the extraordinarily high standard for equitable subordination. The caselaw establishes an extremely high bar, as Your Honor knows. The words that the caselaw uses to describe the conduct that meets the standard are "egregious, improper, and wrongful, so gross and egregious as to be tantamount to fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching, or spoliation; conduct that involves moral turpitude, illegality, or breach of a legally-recognized duty." And that is all from, for example, 80 Nassau Associates, 169 B.R. 832.

Nothing Plaintiffs allege comes anywhere close to meeting that extraordinarily high bar. And you can see that by comparing it to the kind of case that does meet that bar.

For example, in Picard v. Magnify, which comes out of the Madoff Ponzi scheme, the defendant allegedly received \$120 million out of the Madoff Ponzi scheme and allegedly knew that the Madoff scheme would justify that amount by fabricating falsified and backdated trading records.

Or in another example, Judge Drain ordered equitable subordination of claims of a party that Judge Drain concluded violated the automatic stay through "a literally false and intentionally misleading advertising campaign." And that was in Windstream, 627 B.R. 32. That's the kind of conduct that's required for equitable

subordination. And that's also the kind of conduct that is not alleged in Plaintiff's complaint.

Turning to the second prong, injury. Injury in this context means that the Government's conduct must have harmed the bankruptcy results of other creditors in this case. But Plaintiffs can't allege that and haven't alleged that here because, as discussed earlier, the United States asserted forfeiture claims and non-dischargeable claims that could have consumed the entire states and left nothing for other creditors. The DOJ resolution, and in particular the forfeiture judgement credit, greatly enhanced the recoveries of other creditors. And the plan, through the efforts of parties like the UCC and the Ad Hoc Group and others provides for recoveries to personal injury victims. So it's no surprise that Plaintiff's subordination claim is not based on the treatment of their personal injury claims in this case. Instead, it's based on a hypothetical claim, a claim that doesn't exist, and a claim that would only come into being if the United States had obtained a criminal judgement against Purdue before confirmation of a plan if in that hypothetical case the hypothetical sentencing court ordered restitution if that hypothetical order of restitution provided the plaintiffs receive restitution and if in that scenario there was enough money left in the estate and a few enough set of creditors that were the

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beneficiaries of the restitution order that Plaintiffs could recover something from that estate and could recover more than they are scheduled to recover under the plan. And that's a lot of ifs, Your Honor. Plaintiffs don't cite any authority, and we aren't aware of any, that holds that an equitable subordination claim can be premised on losing the chance to receive a hypothetical recovery on a hypothetical claim.

And finally, subordination would also be inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code for two reasons. first is that the MVRA expressly states that it does not create a cause of action "in favor of any person against the United States." And that's from 18 U.S.C. 3664(p). complaint is an attempt to use equitable subordination to do exactly that; to do in bankruptcy court what could not be done in district court, to sue the United States in, Plaintiff's own words, to obtain the rights that Congress has granted under the MVRA. It is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code to allow Plaintiffs to use equitable subordination to circumvent the procedural limitations on the MVRA. And second, to end where we began, Plaintiffs in their own words argue that the suit asked that this Court subordinate the Government's claims because it would be better to dedicate funds to medical treatment than put that money in the treasury. But that's exactly what a bankruptcy

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court cannot do. As this Court well knows and as the Supreme Court has cautioned, a court is not free to use equitable subrogation to adjust the priorities of valid claims because the court perceives that the outcome, that the recoveries on those claims are inequitable. And that's from U.S. v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535. Plaintiff can't subordinate a claim to achieve a result it would like better. And there's no surprise. Nothing would be more self-defeating in this case and more potentially inequitable than to risk toppling what the UCC in its pleading describes as a numerous and delicately-balanced intercreditor settlements that allow the plan to provide billions of dollars in abatement and victim compensation and to avoid years of costly and wasteful intercreditor litigation. And unless the Court has any questions for me, I will now cede the podium to Mr. Fogelman from the United States until time for reply. THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. I think it makes sense to hear from Mr. Fogelman so all of the movants are heard from, and then I'll hear from the other side. So, Mr. Fogelman? MR. FOGELMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Can you hear me clearly? THE COURT: I can hear you just fine. Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, MR. FOGELMAN:

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I'll be brief.

because they forfeited their right to raise the allegations that they have raised in their adversary proceeding. As Debtor's counsel explained, the treatment for the government's claims was resolved nearly three years ago through a 9019 motion that provided how the government's claims would be treated. The plaintiffs had filed proofs of claim months before that proceeding. They had ample opportunity if they objected to the treatment of the government's claims to raise those objections in connection with the 9019 motion. There were multiple objections to the 9019 motion, and there was a full-day hearing to address those objections and to argue about the relief provided in the 9019 order that the Court approved.

And the Plaintiffs never objected, they did not appear, did not make any arguments at the hearing, they did not file any appeal. And for those reasons, Your Honor, this case should be dismissed as they forfeited their rights to now come back years later and make these arguments.

Beyond that, Your Honor, we are prepared to rest on the submission we made in our brief addressing equitable subordination unless the Court has any questions for us.

THE COURT: All right. No, that's fine. Thank you very much. I appreciate your comments. And with that,

I'll turn to the Plaintiffs to hear their argument.

MR. OZMENT: Good morning, Your Honor. My name is
Frank Ozment and I am here for Creighton Bloyd and Stacey
Bridges.

At the outset, a housekeeping matter. Your Honor may have noticed that Valrey Early had also entered an appearance for these parties. Mr. Early is a seasoned bankruptcy practitioner. Unfortunately, he has been in the hospital.

THE COURT: I'm sorry to hear that.

MR. OZMENT: Well, thank you. He is well-known and well-loved in the local bankruptcy bar, and I think he's got a good prognosis.

But bearing in mind the admonition to plead (indiscernible), I think I'll just go forward on my own in light of the briefs that Val put together.

THE COURT: Yeah. And I will just stop you to say that obviously oral argument is to highlight various things that are in the briefs and to sort of have a conversation.

So I have read all the briefs. I will read them again after we are done here today, as is my practice. And so certainly your brief covered the matters well. And so obviously happy to hear from you. And again, please pass along my best wishes for a speedy recovery to your colleague.

MR. OZMENT: Thank you. Speaking first to the

context that -- Your Honor mentioned that you were relatively new to the case. I want to give just a word of context to the kind of recovery or restitution that we're looking for here. It isn't necessarily and is unlikely to be a cash distribution to people who are in recovery. The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act authorizes subsidies for the medical treatment of victims of crimes that involve fraud, and that's what we're looking for here.

When people are in recovery generally speaking, they have a much higher, if not to say dramatically higher, likelihood of recovery if they receive medicine-assisted therapy. That consists of two components. One is the actual medicine itself, which is generally methadone, buprenorphine, or naltrexone. And then that combined with therapy. And so what we're looking for here is the medical subsidy that would support those kinds of recovery.

With respect to the argument that the movants advanced at the outset, we would respectfully submit that the Section 9019 order is not (indiscernible). And in that respect, I think it's helpful to emphasize one thing that we did not really give much treatment to in our briefs, and that is what Judge McMahon said in her order that dealt with the appeal. Of course the Government or the U.S. Trustee had raised issues in that appeal and also raised issues not just about the confirmation order, but also about the

disclosure statement. And at Footnote 71 of our opinion,

Judge McMahon pointed out that she would not take up the

argument regarding the disclosure statement because, like

everything else connected with the confirmation order, it

has fallen by the wayside.

We do have a 9019 order that authorized the entry of a plea agreement. But to the extent that 9019 order may have once served as a bar to recovery, it does no longer in light of the district court --

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you about that. So the confirmation order was what was appealed. And this order was not appealed, and there's still an appeal to the Second Circuit and perhaps an appeal that might go even further. And so clearly there isn't an ultimate resolution yet. And so -- but the confirmation has been appealed, but this order wasn't. And so how am I to understand the significance of that?

MR. OZMENT: It's a very important distinction.

That's part of what is important to focus on in light of the Bennett Funding case. Bennett Funding was about whether an order was appealable I think under 1291 to the Appeals

Court, 28 U.S.C. 1291. And it was really holding that, yes, it is. Even though there are loose ends to be wrapped up, even if some of those loose ends are major, that is a final order for purposes of appeal. It didn't treat whether the

order was res judicata or collaterally estopped. There are orders every day, particularly in my ordinary field of practice, which is civil rights, that are appealable because they are in some sense final within the (indiscernible) statute conferring jurisdiction or appeal, but they are not res judicata. And a prominent example of that would be things like qualified immunity. So if anybody asserts qualified immunity, it's denied, well, they can appeal that even though that's not something that's going to bar anybody (indiscernible) res judicata (indiscernible).

Does that answer your question?

THE COURT: Well, yes and no. So taking what you just said and going from there, so if this is a final order, the 9019 is a final order for purposes of appeal, then it's the law of the case and -- there doesn't seem to be much of a dispute in the papers that granting the relief you request will require that order to be essentially overridden with a different result. Am I missing something on that?

MR. OZMENT: I wouldn't characterize it quite that way, Your Honor. Because our request was fairly limited.

We are not asking to upset at this stage of the proceedings the impact of the settlement, for example, on the states.

What we are saying is that the behavior of the United States was such that we should be equitably subordinated to the amount that is going to be disbursed to them within three

days of the entry or the approval of the plea agreement.

THE COURT: But doesn't that -- all settlements are a series of back and forth, right? And so as part of what the United States ended up with in that settlement where it decided to forego a substantial rights that it might otherwise have, it got this certain amount. And I understand you're not challenging other aspects of the 9019, but a settlement is a bundle of rights. And this would seem to be like the game Jenga; you're trying to pull one out without toppling over the whole thing. But clearly this amount of money under your view, which was provided to go to the United States under the settlement would no longer go to the United States under the settlement in the same way. I mean, that seems pretty clear. Am I right?

MR. OZMENT: Your Honor, I don't want to avoid your question. But I would very, very, very humbly and respectfully submit that's not exactly right. Whether they can withdraw from the settlement is --

THE COURT: Well, they're not trying to withdraw from the settlement. So withdraw is not the right word.

The settlement exists. Can the settlement stay as is if the relief you're requesting is granted? And I think the answer is no. Some parts of it can, but other parts can't.

MR. OZMENT: I think the plea agreement will stand because that's a matter governed by Rule 11 of the Rules of

Criminal Procedure. And in the event that, for example, we came in and we said there's something under the law of equitable subordination that requires Purdue to pay twice as much, you know, that's got to be the deal. Well, in that event, under Rule 11(c), they would have the right to withdraw from the plea agreement.

If we come in and we say, look, the United States still -- Purdue is still getting what they're supposed to get out of the deal under the plea agreement. But, you know, in the bankruptcy court, money will be directed differently. That's not going to authorize the United States to withdraw from the plea agreement. And, quite frankly, I think it's unfathomable that they would do so. I think it would be politically extraordinary for them to take that measure. So that's my answer as best I can on it.

THE COURT: All right. Feel free to move along.

MR. OZMENT: Thank you. With respect to the other arguments regarding the 9019 order as we've talked about and I won't reiterate here at any length, but it does have a lot of pretty serious contingencies in it that would ordinarily in the context of res judicata prohibit an order from having a preclusive effect, even if that order were appealable.

And to that end, I think colloquy at the, excuse me, hearing on a 9019 order is instructed because there was a great deal of emphasis on exactly whether the United States would have

the right to take anything under that deal and only after confirmation. So that's another link, if you will, to confirmation.

With respect to the argument that the movants made regarding law of the case, we would submit that Judge McMahon's remarks are (indiscernible) with respect to what is the standing of orders after the confirmation order was vacated.

Going over to the argument regarding immunity and prosecutorial discretion, I don't think immunity or concepts of it here are at all relevant. If we were, you know, the Inspector General or the Department of Justice and we're looking into, you know, the settlement, then that's a context where immunity would be important. If we were trying to hold the United States civilly liable in some way --

THE COURT: Well, I would respectfully ask you this question that challenges that premise, which is holding the United States liable is one thing, but saying that a criminal case should take a certain path as opposed to a different path, isn't that another form of challenging prosecutorial discretion? Or said another way, the Government's right to proceed as the sovereign in handling criminal matters.

MR. OZMENT: And if we were before the Court, as

parties sometimes do appear before district courts in

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connection with a plea agreement and objecting to it at the appropriate time, then that would be the question there. We're not here to upset whatever the deal is for the Debtor in the plea agreement. We're here to say under the plea agreement, you get what you're getting, Purdue, and the United States is getting what it's getting, but here's -- we believe their interest should be subordinated to (indiscernible). And that gets into the merits of the equitable subordination. But we're not trying to interfere with at this point the (indiscernible) and U.S. District Court in New Jersey. Do that we would -- of course then we would have to move for leave for the -- leave for relief from the automatic stay and then enter an appearance there -THE COURT: Well, even then you wouldn't be able to -- you wouldn't be able to tell -- you would be able to advocate to that district court what to do, but you wouldn't be able to dictate exactly what the result is. You would be a party advocating as opposed to being able to tell the government what position it should take. And, frankly, I have the same concern that -- how do I have the authority to tell the government what position it should take in a criminal matter?

MR. OZMENT: I don't believe -- I don't want you

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to take that position, Your Honor. Nobody could tell them what to do in a criminal matter. I do want you to tell them what to do with the money that was received in that matter in this case.

THE COURT: But again, I think that -- how does that not impact the settlement and everything related -- well, how does that not impact -- doesn't tell the Government what it's supposed to do in those proceedings. Because the settlement contemplates certain things are going to happen -- I'm sorry, it sounds like it contemplates certain things are going to happen in district court. And wouldn't this be telling the government what sort of -- a high dive into a glass of water. You can do something, but you can only do these things because it has to work out this way.

MR. OZMENT: Your Honor, I want to answer your question by focusing on very practical steps that that would involve. So if Your Honor today, or at some point more likely in the future, held that we were entitled to equitable subordination, for the agreement to fall apart, a settlement agreement to fall apart in a way that would impact the bankruptcy, the United States would have to go back to the district court in New Jersey and say we're not getting \$225 million that we anticipated. That money is going to go toward purposes mandated by the mandatory victim

restitution act, and thus we would like to somehow withdraw our support to the guilty plea.

Number one, it's difficult to imagine the United States doing that, but let's assume that they did. Second, I don't know that that would give them the right under Rule 11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to back out of the plea agreement. Number three, I think the United States district court judge would still be well within her rights to say, well, Purdue, you can plead guilty and, you know, I can sentence you. And if the United States doesn't support it, that's fine. I've already agreed.

So I don't think this is -- I don't think

(indiscernible) money within the bankruptcy case, if you

will, necessarily impacts what is going to transpire in U.S.

district court. And that's what I take to be the keystone

of you say unraveling the settlement agreement.

And beyond that, I don't know how else I can explain it. I may be mistaken, but that's how I see it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Counsel?

MR. OZMENT: Briefly touching on the merits, if

you will, of the equitable subordination. If Your Honor

believes that we have not adequately alleged anything

regarding the merits of any subordination. We would ask

that it be dismissed without prejudice -- with prejudice but

(indiscernible) we think we have (indiscernible).

We have been -- or the clients have been adversely impacted. And of course once you get (indiscernible), then you not only get the award, you get a lien for the award. You're a secured creditor. That's a statutory lien that would ordinarily (indiscernible) preference. So for that reason alone it seems to me that there's been a fairly significant impact on the rights of the clients in bankruptcy.

As far as without precedent, I agree, this is not a matter where there is strong precedent. I have not found a case where the United States abandoned the victims under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act on a premise that was factually unsupportable. And yet in the course of doing so, enriched itself. And that's what happened here. There were approximately --

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you about that. That's a consistent theme in your pleadings.

MR. OZMENT: Yes.

THE COURT: But I'm having trouble understanding that word in the context. If the government was entitled to receive a much higher amount of money and in order for other creditors to receive funds and use those funds for abatement and other purposes, that the government agreed to take a lot less, how that's sort of unjust enrichment here. It's

agreeing to take a lot less so that its claim didn't potentially wipe out all recovery in the case. I guess I'm a little confused about the continual theme of sort of unjust enrichment by the Government here. So what's your response to that?

MR. OZMENT: My response to that is that Congress, number one, has mandated that victims have this restitution.

Number two, if the victims had gotten restitution, then they would have been secured creditors. And that would have certainly altered the terrain with respect to how things worked out in the case.

THE COURT: But again, to get back to this issue, that then mandates a certain course of conduct and certain set of positions that you're saying the government has to take in the criminal case.

MR. OZMENT: I don't think the government has to take them. They didn't take them as a matter of fact. And the question is what are the --

THE COURT: Your -- what you just said was the mandated restitution that you were relying on for your argument makes folks, victims secured creditors. But that only happens if certain things happen in the criminal case that -- that haven't happened. And so that would seem to dictate the position that United States would have to take in that criminal case to get to that result. And that gets

Page 55 1 back to our prosecutorial discretion conversation, doesn't 2 it? MR. OZMENT: I haven't thought of it that way, and 3 that's not what I mean to urge. What I mean to say is this, 4 5 that in light of whatever they did, or in light of what in 6 fact they have done, then the question is what follows. And 7 what they have done is they have ignored the Mandatory 8 Victim Restitution Act. Perhaps that was necessary to get a 9 They have taken other steps in connection with the 10 plea agreement. They've taken other steps in connection 11 with the settlement agreement. Now, the question is what 12 happens to the bankruptcy court with the money that would 13 otherwise go to subsidizing medical treatment under the 14 statute. I think that's about as good as I can answer it, 15 Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Counsel? 17 MR. OZMENT: Nothing further, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. And 19 I'll turn to the movants briefly for a targeted reply. 20 MR. TOBAK: Good morning, Your Honor. Marc Tobak 21 from Davis Polk & Wardwell for the Debtors. 22 Just four points. Apologies while I'm attempting 23 to adjust our screen, which isn't cooperating. Okay. 24 So just four points. The first is on finality. 25 As Your Honor noted, the fact that an order is final and

subject to appeal immediately dovetails the question of whether once that time to appeal has run, attacking that order would be a collateral attack because there was resjudicata. And in bankruptcy in particular, the rules for finality are different.

As Your Honor knows and as the Supreme Court recently reiterated in their Ritzen Group case, finality is really important in bankruptcy court because a bankruptcy case is built order by order by order. And just as a party can take an immediate appeal when an order disposes of a discrete element of bankruptcy case, like the 9019 order, on the other hand, when a party doesn't do that, it can't come back later and attack that order collaterally.

And in terms of the question of whether there's something so fundamentally wrong with the 9019 order that it could be collaterally attacked or the terms of the settlement, we don't have to look beyond the Espinosa case.

I mean, there's an order confirming a plan that discharges student debt without making the required findings in violation of two different provisions of the Bankruptcy

Code. But the problem was that the party that held that debt didn't object. And when later the parties said that order is void, it violated the law, and the bankruptcy court has a duty to ensure that a plan conform to the Bankruptcy

Code, the Supreme Court said it's too bad, it's too late.

Once the time to appeal runs, if you don't object and if you don't appeal, it's too late.

And next let's turn to Judge McMahon. The confirmation order and the appeal from the confirmation order for that reason didn't say anything about the 9019 order. The 9019 order was final years before the confirmation order was entered and years before the confirmation order was vacated by Judge McMahon's ruling on appeal.

The question of what the plan may or may not be in this case is separate from the question of whether the 9019 order is final. And under the current confirmation of the case, the DOJ resolution will be -- ultimately be executed.

Now, let's go back to the question about immunity.

I will admit I had trouble understanding the point that this isn't about what the Department of Justice ought to have done, because this is exactly what Your Honor is being asked to do, is to sit in judgement of the policy decisions of the Department of Justice.

First, it's not that the Department of Justice ignored the MVRA. We know in the plea agreement that the Department of Justice found that the factual predicates for not seeking restitution were met. And the question that Plaintiff's counsel has raised is whether the Department of Justice correctly reached that conclusion.

But more importantly, the question about the government abandoning victims is even harder for me to understand. The Government could have taken everything.

They agreed to take only \$2 billion in forfeiture. Then 88 percent of that amount was redirected to victim compensation and abatement, including medical-assisted therapy that would be carried out by the states. And it's that conduct, keeping the \$225 million and not giving that as well as the other 88 percent of the forfeiture judgement that Plaintiffs argue is equivalent to fraud, to be complicit in the Madoff Ponzi scheme or to sending out fraudulent messages and is the kind of illegal, egregious, gross misconduct that would support equitable subordination. Because, again, the Government only gave up 88 percent of its super-priority claim.

And that I think brings us back to the final point. Your Honor, I couldn't say it better than a Jenga tower. The question is what will happen if we take out one of the blocks at the bottom or in the middle of the Jenga tower? What will happen if the settlement, which was agreed to and entered in the final order before the plan was structured, before the creditors and the debtors and the Sackler families had agreed to the final form of the plan and those settlements.

And while Plaintiffs have been willing to

Page 59 speculate about what would happen, the answer is we don't 1 2 know. And as fiduciaries, we can't gamble with billions of 3 dollars dedicated to victim compensation and abatement to play a game of check and see what would happen. And that 4 5 all sets aside, Your Honor, the fundamental question that 6 there's no legal case for equitable subordination under the 7 Code has been made. 8 And so absent any further questions, the Debtors 9 will rest there. 10 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. 11 Mr. Fogelman, I believe you have the last word. 12 MR. FOGELMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Nothing 13 further from the Government. 14 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 15 MR. PREIS: Your Honor? 16 THE COURT: Yes. 17 MR. PREIS: Your Honor, it's Arik Preis from Akin 18 Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld on behalf of the Official 19 Committee. 20 We filed a joinder --21 THE COURT: yes. 22 MR. PREIS: -- to the motion to dismiss. 23 Obviously I didn't speak earlier because we're just a 24 joinder. But if Your Honor would allow us, I'll just make 25 three very brief statements.

THE COURT: Well, it's a bit out of order, Mr. I mean -- so if there are points that are somehow unique to the Committee. But if they're points on the argument, I think I've already had two folks argue on behalf of the folks who filed, the movant. I have your joinder. I am just -- I think your comments would likely start another round of discussions. And I think it's been ably covered by all the advocates here. But is there something unique to the Committee that needs to be pointed out? MR. PREIS: It was covered in our papers, our position. So if you would prefer we don't -- our position is a little bit unique, but it's covered in our papers. And so --THE COURT: Yeah, I have it. I think you're good. So at this juncture, I would suggest that I take your papers -- as I said, I've read them. I'll read them again. And I certainly do understand. And that's why I phrased my question is there something unique to the Committee. But if it's been briefed, I've got it, and I think you're good to go. MR. PREIS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. With that, what I would like to do is schedule a time Monday to provide you all with a bench ruling. And I am flexible on time. So my initial thought would be to pick 11:00 on Monday. But I could also

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Page 61 1 do it at 2:00. So if somebody is tied up with something at 2 11:00, we can easily segue to 2:00. But the first bid and 3 ask is 11:00. And if that works for folks, we'll stick with that. 4 5 MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, that works for 6 Debtors. 7 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Fogelman? 8 MR. FOGELMAN: That works for the Government, Your 9 Honor. Thank you. 10 THE COURT: All right. And counsel for the 11 Plaintiffs? MR. OZMENT: Yes, Your Honor. That's fine. 12 13 THE COURT: All right, great. So we'll do exactly 14 the same thing. Everybody will dial in on Zoom. And it 15 will just be for the purposes of providing a bench ruling on 16 today's motions that were argued. I would like to thank 17 everybody for their argument and wish you all a very good 18 rest of the day and see you next week. Thank you. 19 (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 20 12:17 PM) 21 22 23 24 25

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Page 63 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing 4 transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. 5 6 Soneya M. deslarske Hydl 7 Sonya Ledanski Hyde 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Veritext Legal Solutions 20 21 330 Old Country Road 22 Suite 300 Mineola, NY 11501 23 24 25 Date: March 23, 2023

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